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Board Governance and Corporate Performance in the UK  
Abstract 
We examine the link between the monitoring capacity of the board and corporate performance of UK 
listed firms. We also investigate when and how firms use the flexibility offered by the voluntary 
governance regime to make governance choices. We find a strong positive association between the 
board governance index we construct and operating performance. Our results imply that adherence to 
the board-related recommendations of the UK Code of Corporate Governance helps mitigate agency 
problems, but investors do not value it correspondingly. Moreover, in contrast to prior UK findings 
suggesting efficient adoption of Code recommendations, we find that firms at times use Code flexibility 
opportunistically, which challenges the effectiveness of the voluntary approach to governance 
regulation.  
Keywords: corporate governance, board of directors, comply or explain, board committees, corporate 
governance codes 
JEL classification codes: G30, G34, G38 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the agency theorists, there are two main functions of the board: decision 
management, i.e. initiation and implementation of decisions, and decision control, i.e. 
ratification and monitoring of decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The UK Code of Corporate 
Governance (the Code) reflects this distinction by stating that ”[c]orporate governance is the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled” and “[b]oards of directors are 
responsible for the governance of their companies” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014, p. 1). 
While the primary responsibility for providing direction that is ”setting the strategic aims of the 
company” and ”providing the leadership to put them into effect” (ibidem), i.e. decision 
management, rests with managers (i.e. executive directors), the primary responsibility for 
decision control or ”supervising the management of the business” (ibidem), i.e. monitoring, 
rests with outside directors, termed independent non-executive directors by the Code. From its 
inception in the form of the Cadbury Report in 1992, the Code based on the principle of 
voluntary compliance and mandatory disclosure has encouraged firms to strengthen the 
monitoring capacity of their boards. This is to be achieved primarily by the separation of the 
two top positions on the board i.e. the CEO and the Chair (thereby helping reduce managerial 
power), and by encouraging the presence of (independent) non-executive directors (henceforth 
NEDs) on the board and on its key monitoring committees, namely the remuneration, audit, 
and nomination committees. Hence, in theory, the greater the voluntary adherence to the 
Code’s board related recommendations, the stronger should be the board’s monitoring 
capacity, which in turn should help mitigate agency costs related to managerial opportunism, 
and thus translate into higher operating performance and market value of the firm (cf. Adams et 
al., 2010; Renders et al., 2010). This is the main proposition tested in this study.  
While there are a range of governance mechanisms that can help align managerial and 
shareholder interests, the corporate board is not only considered the ultimate internal monitor 
(Adams et al., 2010; Fama and Jensen, 1983), but it also remains at the center of reforms in the 
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UK, as indeed in code-based systems of corporate governance around the world (Arcot et al., 
2010; European Corporate Governance Institute, 2013). Therefore, our focus on the board and 
its monitoring capacity is rooted in theory and relevant from a policy perspective.  
While some prior studies in the UK (e.g. Arcot et al., 2010; Dahya and McConell, 
2007; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002) as also in the US (e.g. Bhagat and 
Black, 1999; Brown and Caylor, 2009; Klein, 1998) have tested associations between specific 
aspects of the board’s monitoring capacity and various measures of a firm’s financial 
performance, these have generally met with mixed results. This could be due to the data and 
methodological limitations of prior work. First, many prior studies, at least in the UK, employ 
rather limited samples covering at most a few hundred firms, are quite often only cross-
sectional, or cover quite a short time frame (e.g. Arcot and Bruno, 2007; MacNeil and Li, 2006, 
Weir et al. 2002). Second and more importantly, most authors adopt a relatively fragmented 
approach to measuring a board’s monitoring capacity and employ only limited number of firm 
performance measures (e.g. Bhagat and Black, 1999; Brown and Caylor, 2009; Dahya and 
McConnel, 2007; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002). 
Our study contributes to the extant literature in a number of ways. First, we develop a 
board governance index which gauges comprehensively the strength of the board’s monitoring 
capacity based on the extent of adherence to the Code’s key board-related recommendations. 
As pointed earlier, these recommendations are collectively aimed at reducing managerial 
power as well as strengthening the control and oversight function of independent directors. 
Second, we study the associations between this index and various measures of a firm’s 
operating and market performance employing a large new panel dataset on board 
characteristics of UK listed companies spanning the years 1999 to 2008. We find a strong 
positive association between the board index and various measures of a firm’s operating 
performance. This part of our empirical analyses challenges some of the prior UK findings 
(e.g. Arcot et al., 2010; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002) and is consistent with 
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the view that the strengthening of the monitoring capacity of the board (as per adherence to the 
Code’s board related recommendations) may indeed have helped mitigate agency costs and 
enhance firm operating performance. However, consistent in essence with prior US evidence 
on the governance-performance link (Gompers et al., 2003), we find that investors in the UK 
also do not seem to be recognizing the value of governance: subsequent stock returns are 
higher for firms with stronger board monitoring arrangements. These findings imply that the 
market does not appear to be acting as effective monitor of Code adherence (which a voluntary 
governance regime such as that of UK implicitly requires): markets appear neither to factor in 
the value of good board governance arrangements nor penalize poor ones.  
In this study we also address the under-examined issue of ‘when’ and ‘how’ firms use 
the flexibility provided by the UK Code to adjust board governance arrangements. It has been 
argued that the underlying reason for the flexibility offered by the voluntary nature of the Code 
is to allow for sound deviations from recommendations where these are warranted (Arcot et al., 
2010). While the emphasis of the Code recommendations is on strengthening the monitoring 
capacity of the board (as per agency theory: Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), the flexibility of the Code is based on the recognition that there may be times when 
directing, i.e. what agency theorists consider the decision initiation and implementation 
capacity of the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983), may need to be strengthened. A voluntary 
approach to governance favored by regulators in the UK as in many other countries (European 
Corporate Governance Institute, 2013), puts power in the hands of the corporate board to 
choose its structure and composition as it deems appropriate at a particular point in time 
(MacNeil and Li, 2006). Hence, firms may deviate from full adherence to boost the board’s 
directing capacity. For instance, they may aim to strengthen the leadership structure by 
combining the CEO and chair positions (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). They may induct more 
insiders or non-independent outsiders (like past employees) on the board. Such individuals by 
virtue of possessing firm-specific knowledge may then play a more effective advisory role, 
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thus assisting managerial decision making (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Alternatively, driven by 
managerial self-interest (as per agency theory, Jensen and Meckling, 1976), firms may choose 
to weaken the board’s monitoring capacity in order to reduce managerial accountability 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).  
We examine the evidence to discern which of these two alternative propositions holds 
and find support for the latter. In particular, we find that when expecting tough times ahead 
(i.e. weak performance), firms with greater managerial power (as measured by CEO equity 
ownership) or those where managers have greater informational advantage vis-à-vis the outside 
board members, decrease the monitoring capacity of the board by weakening the independence 
of the key board monitoring committees, particularly the remuneration and audit committees. 
This finding challenges the efficient use of Code flexibility suggested by some prior evidence 
(e.g. Hillier and McColgan, 2006; Peasnell et al., 2003; Young, 2000). It also calls into 
question the effectiveness of the self-regulatory approach advocated by the promulgators of the 
Code (cf. MacNeil and Li, 2006). Our study also has implications for the design of an effective 
board (see e.g. Adams et al., 2010). Perhaps, it is not just the proportion of independent NEDs 
on the board that matters for effective oversight, but more importantly, which committees they 
sit on, on the board (Chan and Li, 2008; Yeh et al., 2011). 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
(i) Board Governance and Firm Performance 
Following the seminal work of Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) on agency theory, a large body of theoretical and empirical work has examined the 
effectiveness of various elements of the board’s structure and composition in delivering good 
corporate governance and superior financial performance (for a recent review see Adams et al., 
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2010). In the interest of brevity, we limit our discussion here to only those studies that are most 
relevant to our focus on corporate boards and the board related recommendations of the Code. 
(a) Duality, Governance, and Firm Performance 
A number of scholars have studied the role of the leadership structure at the top, i.e. 
combining of the CEO and chair position (duality) in delivering or otherwise, good governance 
and superior firm performance. The results are largely mixed. While some studies find a 
positive relation of duality with firm performance consistent with the view that by empowering 
managers duality helps speed up decision making and focus accountability (e.g. Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991), others find that by empowering managers it leads to managerial entrenchment 
thus contributing to weak governance and firm performance (e.g. Coles et al., 2001; Core et 
al., 1999). The latter view is also implicit in the UK Code’s key recommendation of splitting 
the CEO and chair positions. Yet other studies find no link between duality and various market 
based measures of firm performance (e.g. Brickley et al., 1997, for the US; Vafeas and 
Theodorou, 1998, and Weir et al., 2002 for UK). However, Dedman (2000) finds that older 
CEOs with longer tenures and higher firm equity ownership are less likely to comply with the 
Code recommendation of splitting CEO-chair roles. To conclude while evidence on the link of 
duality with firm performance is inconclusive, duality does appear to help entrench 
management thus providing support for the Code recommendation of splitting the CEO and the 
chair roles.  
(b) Board Independence, Governance, and Firm Performance  
 According to Fama and Jensen (1983), the primary responsibility for board oversight 
(including the hiring, firing and compensating of the top managers) rests with the outside 
directors, termed independent NEDs by the Code, on corporate boards. Such NEDs are 
expected to perform these functions primarily through their adequate representation on the 
board and its key monitoring committees, i.e. the remuneration, audit, and nomination 
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committees (discussed below). Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) theorize that whilst being 
selected through a process at least partially controlled by the CEO, more independent boards 
can be more effective at monitoring the CEO because the opportunity cost of monitoring (what 
they term as the board’s distaste for monitoring) declines with rising board independence and 
information about CEO ability and firm’s operations. Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) and 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that outside directors can be effective monitors due to 
their reputational concerns in the managerial and directorial labor markets.  
Based either explicitly or implicitly on the above rationale, many studies have 
examined the link between insider-outsider ratio on boards and firm performance, providing 
mixed results. While Brown and Caylor (2009) and Bhagat and Black (2002) in the US and 
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) and Weir et al. (2002) in the UK find no link between board 
independence and firm performance, Dahya and McConnell (2007) document a positive link 
with firm operating performance, especially for firms which become compliant with the 
corresponding Cadbury recommendation post-1992.  
Evidence also suggests that independent directors perform an effective oversight role. 
For instance, Weisbach (1988) for the US and Dahya et al. (2002) for the UK, both find a 
higher sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor firm performance in companies with more 
independent boards. Conyon and Peck (1998) for the UK and Core et al. (1999) for the US 
provide evidence consistent with the notion that boards with more outside directors are better 
able at aligning CEO pay with firm performance. In terms of NEDs’ role in CEO succession, 
Boeker and Goodstein (1991) find lower likelihood of CEOs being replaced by outsiders, in 
insider dominated boards in the US. Finally, Beasley (1996) finds a lower likelihood of 
financial fraud in companies having a higher proportion of outside directors. Thus, while the 
link with firm performance is mixed, board independence is associated with increased 
effectiveness of the boards in carrying out their oversight function.  
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(c) Independence of Key Board Monitoring Committees  
As noted earlier, board’s controlling activities are mostly performed through 
established committees, e.g. audit, nomination, or remuneration committees (Adams et al., 
2010). Different committees discharge different oversight functions and thus they require 
specific expertise. Consequently, it is likely that the relationship between board composition, 
independence, and corporate performance may be more complex than discussed earlier. In 
particular, it might be that it is the quality of specific committees rather than that of the entire 
board that enhances firm value (Chan and Li, 2008; Yeh et al., 2011).  
There is evidence to suggest that board governance effectiveness often goes hand in 
hand with the quality and independence of key board committees. For instance, Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) show that when CEOs serve on the nominating committee or when there is no 
such committee, fewer independent directors are appointed and the market reaction to such 
appointments is less favorable. They interpret this finding as the evidence of powerful CEOs 
being able to influence the structure of the board. Beasley (1996) finds a lower probability of 
fraud on boards with more independent audit committees. Moreover, Conyon and Peck (1998) 
document that managerial compensation is more performance sensitive in companies with 
more independent remuneration committees.  
In sum, while the evidence on the link between various individual dimensions of board 
governance and corporate performance is somewhat mixed, the extant literature suggests that, 
taken together, the aspects of board structure and composition as recommended by the Code 
have the potential to strengthen the oversight function of the board. In particular, the separation 
of CEO and chair positions, board independence, and independence of key board monitoring 
committees should have this effect. Therefore, we conjecture that adherence to the 
corresponding Code guidelines should strengthen board oversight function thus helping 
mitigate agency problems faced by corporations and hypothesize that: 
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Hypothesis 1: Higher voluntary adherence to the Code’s board-related recommendations 
is associated with higher firm operating performance and market value.  
(ii) Use of the Code Flexibility 
As discussed earlier, the voluntary nature of the Code is intended to allow firms the 
flexibility to make sound deviations from the rule where these are warranted (Arcot et al., 
2010). Hence, there may be circumstances where there is a need to strengthen the directing 
capacity of the board. In this regard, Young (2000) echoes the concerns expressed among the 
business community at the time of the Code’s introduction that its emphasis on strengthening 
the control function may inhibit managerial enterprise and commercial competitiveness. 
Aguilera et al. (2008) highlight that compliance with governance codes involves opportunity 
costs such as directors’ time spent on governance issues instead of business strategy, changes 
in managerial risk preferences, or proprietary costs (e.g. costs of disclosure of strategic 
information).  
In terms of using the UK Code’s flexibility, prior empirical evidence indicates that 
firms have generally made efficient choices adjusting their board structure and composition 
based on perceived corporate costs and benefits. Peasnell et al. (2003) and Young (2000), 
studying the periods closely following the introduction of the Cadbury recommendations, find 
that larger firms having less than suggested number of NEDs adjusted their board structures to 
meet the Cadbury recommendations. Similar trends in compliance were also observed by 
Dahya and McConnell (2007) and Hillier and McColgan (2006).  
The preceding discussion suggests that adherence to the Code’s recommendations is a 
considered choice made by the management, usually based on perceived corporate costs and 
benefits. Moreover the CEO (as perhaps the only or among the very few insiders on the board, 
Jensen, 1993) is in the best position to assess these costs and benefits given his/her superior 
firm-specific knowledge vis-à-vis the outside directors on the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
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Thus, given this informational advantage coupled with his/her bargaining power (based on 
his/her perceived ability and other measures of power, such as level of equity ownership), 
CEOs are likely to be able to influence the structure and composition of the board as they see 
appropriate at a point in time (Boone et al., 2007; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). 
Accordingly, if the managers expect difficult times ahead for the firm, they may strive to adopt 
a board structure that could potentially enhance the directing capacity of the board. For 
example, firms may appoint experienced insiders or non-independent NEDs (e.g. past 
employees) to the board. Such members by virtue of possessing valuable firm- and industry-
specific knowledge can play a more effective advisory role and assist the board in effective 
decision making (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Klein 1998). Alternatively, a firm may choose to 
unify the chair and CEO posts, which can help speed up board decision making and focus 
accountability (cf. Brickley et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). In short, given that 
adherence is a choice which potentially involves a tradeoff between the directing and 
monitoring capacities of the board, firms may choose not to comply if the benefits of non-
compliance for the firm exceed the costs. 
Alternatively, driven by opportunism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the threat of 
declining bargaining power vis-à-vis outsiders on the board (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), 
managers expecting weak performance (especially in firms where they have greater 
informational advantage or higher managerial power) may try to weaken the monitoring 
capacity of the board and impose more executive-friendly board arrangements. As discussed 
earlier, Dahya et al. (2002) and Weisbach (1988) show that more independent boards are more 
likely to dismiss underperforming CEOs. Independence of remuneration committees is also 
found to be associated with greater pay-performance sensitivity (e.g. Conyon and Peck, 1998; 
Core et al., 1999). Thus, less compliant (and, by implication, weaker) board and board 
monitoring committees may be less likely to hold executives accountable for poor firm 
performance. In essence, this rationale is similar to the argument put forward by Gompers et al. 
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(2003), who suggest that managers expecting weak firm performance could stymie hostile 
takeovers by amending charter provisions accordingly. Hence, non-compliance in the wake of 
poor performance may be driven by opportunism and self-interest rather than efficiency 
reasons on the part of management. 
Finally, Crutchley et al. (2002) provide evidence of outside board members leaving 
poorly performing firms to protect their reputation capital (cf. Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Consistent with this argument, Gilson (1989) provides evidence that directors who leave prior 
to announcement of bankruptcy can avoid subsequent devaluation in the labor market. Thus, it 
is plausible that in the wake of looming underperformance firms might find it more difficult to 
attract or retain (independent) NEDs due to reputational considerations and, as a result, their 
compliance with the Code letter may fall. Such a loss of independent monitors from the board 
is likely to result in the weakening of its monitoring capacity. 
Given the alternative explanations outlined above, we propose the following two 
competing hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 2a: Firms decrease voluntary compliance with the Code in order to strengthen 
the directing capacity of the board. 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms decrease voluntary compliance with the Code in order to weaken the 
monitoring capacity of the board.  
3. SAMPLE AND INDEX CONSTRUCTION 
(i) Sample 
The sample is constructed as the intersection of BoardEx and Thomson ONE Banker 
databases for UK listed companies. We analyze BoardEx data on board characteristics 
covering the years 1999-2008 and merge it with financial data collected from Worldscope and 
Datastream (retrieved via Thomson ONE Banker). Given lead-lag structure of our research 
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design, we collect the corresponding financial data for the period, 1998-2009. While BoardEx 
coverage of UK firms yields an unbalanced panel of 11,712 firm-years (corresponding to 2,212 
companies), availability of data for some financial variables restricts sample size to 10,493 
firm-years. In our analyses of portfolio performance we estimate four-factor model of Carhart 
(1997) and employ UK factor-mimicking portfolios constructed by Gregory et al. (2013). 
Finally, in some analyses of our analyses we employ data on analyst EPS forecasts from 
I/B/E/S (retrieved via WRDS). 
Our data set thus covers the vast majority of market capitalization of the London Stock 
Exchange (both of the main market and of the AIM) for the period analyzed. The analysis 
excludes exchange-traded funds and similar financial companies (as for most of them the board 
structure is different than that for other firms). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 
sample (pooled across 10 years).  
---------------------------------------  
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
(ii) Board Index Construction 
While studies examining the governance-performance link based on individual 
governance mechanisms have been less than fruitful (e.g. Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998, and 
Weir et al., 2002, for the UK; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, and Bhagat and Black, 1999, for 
the US), studies which have examined this link by developing an index measuring the overall 
governance quality based on different aspects of governance (e.g. strength of shareholder rights 
in the case of Gompers et al., 2003) have proved more successful. These include the initial 
work of Gompers et al. (2003), followed by Brown and Caylor (2006), Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008), Bebchuk et al. (2009), and Renders et al. (2010). All of these studies tend to find a 
positive link between indices capturing various aspects of a firm’s governance and various 
measures of a firm’s financial performance. A possible explanation for the success of the index 
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approach in governance-performance studies is that an index potentially better captures the 
overall strength of a particular aspect of governance (say, shareholder rights in Gompers et al., 
2003) or level of managerial entrenchment (Bebchuk et al., 2009), thus improving the power of 
the test of the aspect of governance in question. 
While the index approach has also been adopted for studies of emerging markets (e.g. 
Black et al., 2006) and of other legal settings besides the US (e.g. Henry, 2008, for Australia), 
the corresponding body of work for the UK is considerably smaller. Arcot and Bruno (2007) 
and Arcot et al. (2010) are notable exceptions, but they use quite a small sample and focus 
primarily on the decision to comply or to explain. In addition, the multi-country study by 
Renders et al. (2010) employing the index approach (based on Deminor ratings) covers a very 
small subsample of UK listed firms. Hence, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is one of 
the first UK studies adopting an index approach to studying the link between the board’s 
monitoring capacity and a firm’s financial performance, using a large longitudinal data set.  
While Gompers et al. (2003) focus on the strength of the shareholder rights in the US 
(based on an index which counts the number of anti-takeover provisions adopted by US firms), 
in this study, we focus on the strength of the monitoring capacity of the board (based on the 
number of board-related provisions of the UK Code adopted by a firm). Our index takes clear 
guidance from the Code’s recommendations related to different oversight functions of the 
board and thus it allows us to comprehensively gauge the monitoring capacity of the board. 
Moreover, our index construction approach allows us to focus on the quality of governance 
arrangements at both board and board sub-committee level, in line with the arguments put 
forward by Chan and Li (2008) and Yeh et al. (2011) regarding the importance of committee 
composition in performing its oversight function. Consistent with the approach in the prior 
literature (e.g. Brown and Caylor, 2006; Gompers et al., 2003; Renders et al., 2010), we 
consider the index components to be complementary and thus additive (cf. Bhagat et al., 2008), 
as different elements of the index pertain to different aspects of board monitoring capacity. For 
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instance, CEO/chair separation deals with division of role and power at the top, so that no one 
individual dominates the board; independence of remuneration committee is meant to facilitate 
better tying of executive pay with performance, while audit committee related 
recommendations deal with improving the quality of audit and financial reporting, etc. Hence, 
the Code’s board recommendations can be seen as complementary aspects of strong 
governance arrangements at the board level. Moreover, we follow a large body of literature 
employing the index approach (introduced in the context of governance studies by Gompers et 
al., 2003) and construct the index by weighting different provisions equally. 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics over the entire period for the provisions we 
take into account for constructing the board index (mean values for each provision are 
presented in parentheses in the text below). In particular, the 1998 version of the Code 
recommends that the board of directors should not be chaired by the company CEO (in 
approximately 16% of the sample, however, this is the case). Moreover, at least one-third of 
the board members should be NEDs (91.36%), the majority of whom should also be 
independent (74.43%).1 The board should have a senior independent member other than the 
chair, either a deputy chair or a senior NED (56.50%). The board should have remuneration 
(89.00%), audit (98.81%), and nomination (60.57%) committees, and the prior two committees 
should be headed by independent NEDs (70.69% and 71.93%, respectively). The remuneration 
committee should be composed entirely of independent NEDs (53.48%). The audit committee 
                                                 
1 It is important to clarify at this point, that the UK code makes a clear distinction between NEDs, or so called 
‘outside’ directors in the US, and independent NEDs. For instance, the 2003 version of the Code stipulates that 
NEDs are deemed formally independent, if they satisfy the following criteria: (1) a director has not previously 
been an employee of the company, (2) has no family ties with other board members, (3) has no business link with 
the company, (4) receives no remuneration other than a fee for a directorship, (5) does not hold a cross-
directorship, (6) does not represent a significant shareholder, and (7) has not been on the board for more than nine 
years. 
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should be composed of NEDs only, the majority of whom should be independent (78.59%). 
Finally, the nomination committee should be chaired either by the chairman of the board or by 
an NED (33.15%) and the majority of its members should be NEDs (59.39%).  
---------------------------------------  
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 For each of the provisions, we assign a value of 1 for compliance and 0 for non-
compliance with the Code’s recommendations and define the board index for each firm-year as 
the sum of its scores on each of the 13 provisions. Hence, the index value can vary between 0 
and 13, with 13 corresponding to full adherence to the Code’s recommendations related to 
board structure and composition.  
The high mean and median values of the board index (9.38 and 10.00, respectively) 
suggest that in the sample period firms are designing the board largely in accordance with the 
Code’s recommendations. However, Table 2 shows that there is some variation in this respect 
over the years. While adherence is increasing over the period 1999 to 2002, it starts declining 
from 2003 onwards, picking up again in 2008. One plausible explanation for this pattern might 
be that during stock market boom years, i.e. when stock performance is strong (as was the case 
between 2003 and 2007), investors care relatively less about compliance with the Code and let 
the companies get away with lower quality of governance arrangements (MacNeil and Li, 
2006). 
Importantly, the upward trend in adherence to the Code’s board related 
recommendations documented by some earlier studies for the periods immediately following 
the Cadbury Report (e.g. Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Guest, 2008; Hillier and McColgan, 
2006) does not appear to be sustained in the early years of the 21st century. Also, the trends 
illustrated here are unlikely to be caused by the sample composition effects, as discussed in the 
robustness check section.  
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Panel B of Table 2 illustrates the size of a typical board tends to decrease over time 
(consistent with the prior evidence, e.g. Guest, 2008): while in 1999 the average board size is 
almost 9, the corresponding numbers for 2006-2008 are below 6.5. About half of the board 
members are NEDs, majority of whom could be classified as independent. Interestingly, 
despite the growing pressure from the regulators to strengthen the role of independent NEDs, 
their actual share of the board seats tends to decrease slightly over time.2 
In untabulated analyses, we also find that a typical audit committee consists of 3 non-
executive members, most of whom can be classified as independent NEDs. Similar patterns 
can be observed for remuneration committees. About 2/3 of the companies have a nomination 
committee in place (although this number tends to decrease over time). A typical nomination 
committee has 4 members, 3 of whom are NEDs. The nomination committee is usually chaired 
by the Board Chair (unlike audit or remuneration committees). 
4. ANALYSIS 
(i) Governance, Operating Performance, and Firm Value  
In this section we examine if higher board monitoring capacity is associated with 
superior operating performance and higher firm valuation, as postulated by Hypothesis 1. 
Specifically, we examine whether average and median values of performance indicators differ 
between firms belonging to a portfolio of companies with the strongest board governance 
                                                 
2 Maintaining the essence of the definition of NED non-independence, the 2003 version of the Code re-phrased it 
and made the criteria more explicit (see Footnote 1 above). While it is plausible that this formal change explains 
part of the decrease in the proportion of independent NEDs between 2003 and 2004 (and the corresponding drop 
in the values of the index then), it is unlikely to provide an explanation for the persistent trend of decreasing 
proportion of independent NEDs observed throughout most of the sample, i.e. from 1999 until 2006. Hence, we 
do not believe that the 2003 non-independence definition change is a driving factor for our remaining findings. 
Yet, we acknowledge that it could be considered a limitation of our study. 
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arrangements (as indicated by the Code adherence) and those belonging to a portfolio of 
companies with the weakest board governance standards. The methodology applied in this 
portfolio performance test is similar to that followed by Gompers et al. (2003). Since 
governance provisions are recorded annually in the database, for each of the sample years, we 
examine the distribution of the board governance index every year. Each year, we then 
construct two equally-weighted portfolios: firm-years where index values do not exceed 5 
(which corresponds to the bottom quintile of our sample) are classified as belonging to the 
weak governance portfolio while observations where index equals 13 (i.e. the top quintile) are 
classified as belonging to the strong governance portfolio. 
Table 3 provides support for Hypothesis 1 with respect to measures of operating 
performance. The differences in industry-adjusted3 indicators of operating performance 
between firms belonging to strong and weak governance portfolios (see above) are highly 
significant both contemporaneously and in the subsequent year. However, the average (and 
median) contemporaneous Tobin’s Q of the best governed firms is not significantly different 
from that of the worst governed ones. Taken together, these findings suggest that while strong 
governance arrangements at the board level are associated with lower agency problems and 
higher firm operating performance, investors do not seem to immediately recognize their value.  
---------------------------------------  
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
(ii) Portfolio Return Analysis 
While the analysis above has established a positive association between the board’s 
monitoring capacity and firm operating performance, in this section we examine further 
whether investors value it. Specifically, we verify whether there are significant differences in 
stock performance of the weak and the strong governance portfolios defined above. In 
                                                 
3 Industry definitions throughout the paper are based on 17-industry classification by Fama and French (1997). 
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particular, we examine a zero-investment portfolio which comprises a long position in the 
strong governance portfolio and a short position in the weak governance portfolio. We then 
analyze total shareholder returns on these portfolios over the year following the year on which 
the classification is based, i.e. we use governance provisions in year t to construct portfolios 
and then analyze their performance in year (t+1). We use monthly data and assume that the 
portfolios are re-balanced monthly to keep equal weights of its constituents. Having computed 
the portfolio returns, we investigate whether the differences in performance of the two 
portfolios could be attributed to differing characteristics of these portfolios. In this attribution 
analysis we follow Gompers et al. (2003) and employ the four-factor model by Carhart (1997) 
with the UK factor-mimicking portfolios constructed by Gregory et al. (2013). Like Gompers 
et al. (2003) we remain agnostic as to whether the factors employed are proxies for risk and we 
interpret the estimated intercept coefficient as the abnormal return in excess of what could have 
been achieved by passive investment in the factor portfolios. 
-----------------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
In untabulated analyses, we find that the portfolio of firms with strongest governance 
arrangements delivered higher unadjusted total shareholder return, compared with the portfolio 
of firms with the weakest board governance standards. This result holds consistently in every 
year between 2000 and 2009. Moreover, Table 4 illustrates that the discrepancy in performance 
of the two portfolios cannot be explained by their differing characteristics (proxied by the four 
factor exposures). The results suggest that the portfolio of companies falling short on strong 
governance arrangements in the preceding year tend to consistently underperform a passive 
strategy of investing in factor portfolios. Therefore, the investment strategy of buying 
companies with the best board governance arrangements and of shorting firms with the 
weakest standards delivers a highly significant monthly alpha of 182bp over the sample period. 
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Consistent with preceding analysis, the results suggest that in the UK investors fail to 
recognize the value of strong governance arrangements even more substantially than in the US 
market (as estimated by Gompers et al., 2003). The earlier results pertaining to Tobin’s Q in 
Table 3 are also consistent with this claim: contemporaneous valuations of the best governed 
firms are not significantly different from those for the worst governed ones.  
Moreover, contrary to the findings of Bebchuk et al. (2013) who document 
convergence of returns on strong and weak governance firm portfolios in the US in the 
beginning of the 21st century, here we show that the corresponding wedge in the UK is still 
present and very sizeable even in recent years. 
(iii) When and How Are Governance Arrangements Adjusted?  
The findings discussed so far are consistent with the view that firms with stronger 
governance arrangements tend to enjoy stronger operating performance, but that investors do 
not immediately appreciate the implications of such arrangements for firm value. However, as 
discussed earlier, adherence to the Code recommendations is a considered choice. Thus, firms 
that expect weak performance may choose to adopt weaker governance arrangements in the 
wake of it. As discussed earlier, there are competing reasons why this might be the case. First, 
non-compliance with the Code may be a step in the right direction when the firm expects 
difficult times ahead and needs to enhance the directing capacity of the board in line with the 
predictions of Hypothesis 2a. Alternatively, the reason for non-compliance in the wake of poor 
performance may be to weaken the monitoring capacity of the board, consistent with 
Hypothesis 2b. 
--------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
If decreasing values of the governance index are indeed a response to expected low 
performance, one would expect performance of firms where the index decreases to be lower 
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(subsequent to the decrease) compared to otherwise similar firms. Therefore, we compare 
performance indicators for a company weakening its governance arrangements with 
performance of a matched firm with the same governance score kept unchanged from the 
previous year. A focal firm is a firm that reduced its board governance index between year (t-1) 
and t. For a focal firm, the matching firm is a firm from the same industry for which the index 
in both year (t-1) and t is the same as that for the focal firm in year t. If more than one match 
exists, the firm closest in size is chosen as the matching firm. Both the focal firm and the 
matched firm have the same governance score in year t (and, thus, they are likely to have 
similar monitoring capacity), while only the focal firm experienced recent deterioration of it. 
Table 5 illustrates that both operating performance and subsequent valuation of firms 
weakening their governance are worse than those for the matched sample of firms.  
The results of Table 5 indicate that the weakening of governance arrangements 
precedes weak firm performance. Below, we provide more direct evidence consistent with the 
claim that governance change is a considered action of managers anticipating weak firm 
performance. In Table 6, we examine firms’ decisions to lower, maintain, or increase the 
values of their board governance index. In particular, we investigate whether CEO power 
(proxied by the percentage of equity outstanding owned by the CEO, cf. Boone et al., 2007) 
and management information advantage vis-à-vis outsiders (as reflected by measures of 
information asymmetry, namely standard deviation of stock returns or dispersion of analyst 
earnings forecasts, cf. Core et al., 1999; Dittmar and Thakor, 2007; Guest, 2008; Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996) are positively associated with the likelihood of weakening board governance 
arrangements. Controlling for a number of firm characteristics (i.e. starting value of the 
governance index, firm performance, firm size, board size, as well as year and industry fixed 
effects), we find that this is indeed the case: the coefficients for all three of the aforementioned 
variables are significant and negative as expected.  
21 
 
---------------------------------------  
Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
While the results reported in Tables 5 and 6 are consistent with the claim that 
governance arrangements are weakened in anticipation of expected weak performance, they do 
not distinguish between competing rationales for such behavior (i.e. Hypotheses 2a and 2b). 
Table 7 reports our test of Hypothesis 2a against 2b and examines the arrangements that are 
most likely to be changed by firms reducing their board governance index. It indicates that the 
axe is falling most frequently on the independence of the remuneration committee: 35% of the 
companies decreasing compliance weaken this aspect. This is followed by appointment of non-
independent chairs of key board committees, i.e. nomination (23%), remuneration (21%), and 
audit (18%). Taken together the results of this section suggest that it is likely to be managerial 
opportunism rather than efficiency considerations which drive firms to become less compliant 
in the face of weak performance. In other words, the evidence appears consistent with 
Hypothesis 2b rather than 2a: firms attempt to weaken the monitoring capacity of the board, in 
situations where such capacity can be detrimental to the interests of the management. While 
about a sixth of the companies decreasing compliance bring in the duality of the CEO and the 
chair, in the light of the other results discussed, it is plausible that such a step serves the 
purpose of increasing entrenchment rather than speeding up board decision making and 
focusing accountability. 
Moreover, the relatively low occurrence of companies suddenly falling short of 
sufficient proportion of independent NEDs on their boards (11.3%) suggests that firms adopt 
more tacit techniques in weakening the board’s monitoring capacity. It seems that it is easier to 
‘clip the wings’ of independent NEDs by reshuffling their positions on the board rather than 
their outright removal. This finding is consistent with the insight of Alan J. Patricof, a leading 
US venture capitalist, who argues that “[d]eep down [CEOs] really wish they didn't have 
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boards. That's why, at the end of the day, most independent directors get neutralized in one 
fashion or another” (Smale et al., 1995, p. 158).  
Our findings are also consistent with the conjecture of Chan and Li (2008) who argue 
that key committee independence is far more important than the independence of the board per 
se. Finally, as we find no sudden drop in the proportion of NEDs on the board, our results 
provide little support for the claim that NEDs may ‘jump the ship’ for reputational reasons in 
anticipation of poor performance.  
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
(i) Alternative Board Governance Index (New Board Governance Index) 
A new version of the Code stipulating a more stringent set of governance provisions 
regarding the design of the board came into force in 2003. Specifically, the 2003 version calls 
for the majority of the board to consist of independent NEDs, with the board chair position also 
to be held by an NED deemed independent at the time of appointment to the position. The 
purpose of these new provisions was to further improve board balance, i.e. the division of 
power at the top (by encouraging independence of board chair), as well as to further strengthen 
the monitoring capacity of the board (by not only having more independent NEDs, but also 
requiring audit committee and remuneration committee to be composed exclusively of 
independent NEDs.  
We amend the board governance index accordingly and construct a new index 
(henceforth, the new board governance index), which takes into account these new 
recommendations. While the actual governance recommendations used to construct the new 
board governance index were only published in 2003, the analysis of this new index and its 
link to subsequent corporate performance over the entire sample period is still meaningful. It 
allows us to examine whether investors perceived differently board governance provisions 
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recommended by the version of the Code in place at the time (i.e. 1998 version) and those, 
more exacting ones, going beyond its letter. It also allows us to verify the claim by Henry 
(2008) that governance arrangements adopted by firms beyond those imposed by regulations 
and common practices among firms in a given country have a strong, positive effect on firm 
performance. Moreover, it provides an additional robustness check of the previously tested 
relation. 
The new board governance index can also take values ranging from 0 to 13 with higher 
values corresponding to stronger governance arrangements. The results pertaining to the new 
board governance index are not reported, but available upon request. Strikingly, the trends 
observed here are mirroring those for the board governance index (discussed earlier, see Table 
2) almost perfectly and the two indices are quite highly correlated. This suggests that in the 
UK, as has been the philosophy of the Code from the beginning, it is the prevailing best 
practice that is later codified rather than the other way round. Furthermore, the declining trend 
in average values of the new board governance index over the post-2003 period suggests that 
UK companies appear not to pay much heed to the set of recommendations issued in the 2003 
version of the Code. Finally, the conclusions of the analysis employing the new board 
governance index are fully in line with those reported earlier.  
(ii) Index Changes v. Sample Composition Effects 
The analysis of within-firm index changes suggests that the overall trends in adherence 
to the Code are not due to the sample composition effects. By construction, this approach 
requires tracking the same firms over two consecutive years. Therefore, it highlights the 
changes in index stemming from firms changing their adherence to the Code rather than the 
changes in sample composition. We find that the governance is less sticky than indicated by 
some earlier studies (e.g. Arcot et al., 2010) and companies actually do change over time as far 
as their adherence to the Code is concerned. Specifically, the average absolute change of the 
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index is 0.67 per year, which is a much higher magnitude than the average change of 0.6 over 
three-year intervals documented by Gompers et al. (2003) for their US index. This is not 
entirely surprising: our index captures the quality of governance arrangements at the board 
level while the measure constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) focuses on charter provisions. It 
is likely that board arrangements are more flexible and easier to modify than charter 
provisions. Moreover, we also find that in about a third of firm-years observed, the value of the 
index actually changes compared to the previous year. This proportion varies between 28.61% 
in 2006 and 42.14% in 1999.  
(iii) Board Governance v. Other Governance Mechanisms 
Some prior studies (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Hillier 
and McColgan, 2006; Peasnell et al., 2003; Young, 2000) suggest that governance 
arrangements at the board level might be related to the presence and strength of other 
governance mechanisms such as managerial ownership, incentive pay for executives, leverage, 
etc. Thus, we examine whether monitoring capacity of the board can help to mitigate agency 
problems even after controlling for the presence of other governance mechanisms. In order to 
do so we model firm performance and firm value as functions of board governance index, other 
governance mechanisms (i.e. CEO equity-linked wealth, CEO incentive pay, leverage), and 
control variables (i.e. CEO tenure, board size, firm size, and asset intangibility). All the 
regressors are lagged one year (and thus, predetermined) to address the issue of possible 
endogeneity of the governance-performance link (see Adams et al., 2010; Renders et al., 
2010). We employ Petersen (2009) two-way clustering of standard errors procedure to account 
for the panel structure of the dataset. 
Table 8 illustrates that, after controlling for other governance mechanisms, board 
monitoring capacity tends to be associated with better operating performance although this 
result does not hold uniformly across all three of the performance measures: while the 
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coefficients for the board governance index are positive and highly significant in regressions 
explaining ROA and ROIC, the corresponding estimate is not significantly different from zero 
in Model 5 (explaining ROE). In line with the results of Section 4, we do not find the effects of 
board monitoring capacity on firm value in Model 7 here. Regarding other governance 
mechanisms, only CEO incentive pay is associated with both stronger operating performance 
and higher firm value. Moreover, we find that larger companies managed by longer-tenured 
CEOs, having smaller boards and less intangible asset base tend to outperform their industry 
peers.  
------------------------------------------------  
Insert Tables 8 and 9 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Section 4.iii above suggests that companies might opportunistically change their board 
arrangements in anticipation of future weak performance and therefore the regressions reported 
in Table 8 above might be affected by endogeneity problems. We address this issue in Table 9 
where we estimate instrumental-variable random-effect panel regression model counterparts of 
Models 4-7 from Table 8.  
In 2003 the UK Corporate Governance Code has been revised (see Section 5.i above) 
and this provides us with an exogenous shock allowing us to examine the effects of board 
monitoring capacity on firm performance. Therefore, we use the post-2003 dummy as an 
instrument for the index in Models 4A-7A in Table 9. Moreover, prior empirical evidence for 
the UK (e.g. Arcot and Bruno, 2007; Dedman, 2000; Hillier and McColgan, 2006; Young, 
2000) as well as our analyses suggest that adherence to board-related recommendations is 
strongly related to firm size. Thus, in Models 4B-7B, we use firm size as an alternative 
instrument for the index.  
Overall, Table 9 documents that, after controlling for the strength of other governance 
mechanisms and potential endogeneity of the board governance index, board monitoring 
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capacity is strongly and significantly associated with better operating performance (for all 
performance indicators used). Consistent with the earlier results, we find no statistically 
significant association between board monitoring capacity and firm value. While in Table 9 we 
document that CEO equity-linked wealth and incentive pay are associated with better operating 
performance and higher firm value, the effects of other variables examined there are in line 
with those reported in Table 8 earlier. 
(iv) TSR and Firm Characteristics  
We also examine if the phenomenon of higher stock returns for companies with 
stronger corporate governance arrangements is not due to observable firm characteristics. In 
the regression framework employing Petersen (2009) two-way clustering of standard errors, we 
model annualized TSR as a function of the lagged board governance index, a vector of firm-
year specific control variables (i.e. profitability, firm size, leverage, the price-to-earnings ratio, 
and asset intangibility) lagged one year, and industry and year fixed effects.  
In line with the results reported in the main body of the paper, these additional analyses 
(not reported, but available upon request) again reveal a significant positive relationship 
between the TSR and the board governance index, after controlling for firm characteristics, as 
well as industry and year fixed effects. Hence, all else equal, companies with stronger board 
arrangements (from the Code point of view) tend to deliver higher returns.  
(v) Other Robustness Checks  
Instead of defining weak and strong governance portfolios using absolute thresholds (as 
explained in Section 4.i), we also considered portfolios based on relative thresholds, i.e. weak 
(strong) governance portfolio comprising companies belonging to the bottom (top) quintile of 
the board governance index distribution in a particular year. The resulting cutoff points vary 
substantially depending on the year. For instance, in years 1999-2001 companies with the 
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board governance index value of 7 or less end up in the weak governance portfolio, while for 
years 2006-2008 the corresponding criterion is that the board governance index value is 4 or 
less only. The results of analyses employing these alternatively defined portfolios are virtually 
identical to those reported earlier in the paper. 
Finally, our sample covers three distinctive sub-periods, i.e. the peak and collapse of the 
so-called dotcom bubble, the period of credit expansion from 2003 to 2006, and the onset of 
the global financial crisis from late 2007 until the end of the sample. In untabulated analyses 
we find that the results robustly hold in each of these three sub-periods and are not driven by 
observations from any of them. 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides new evidence on the link between board monitoring capacity and 
firm performance for a panel of UK companies. We not only refine the methodological 
approach followed by a number of prior UK studies (e.g. MacNeil and Li, 2006; Vafeas and 
Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002), but also provide novel empirical evidence. Employing a 
large longitudinal data set, we capture the overall strength of the monitoring capacity of the 
board by developing a board index. This approach differs from the relevant prior UK research 
which is largely cross-sectional and studies associations between individual monitoring 
mechanisms on the board and firm performance.  
We report a number of novel results. First, consistent with prior related evidence we 
find adherence with board-related recommendations rises from 1999 to 2002, but in the period 
following that covered by prior related studies, i.e. between 2003 and 2007, we find that 
adherence declines despite the Code’s call for increased independence of the boards, post 2003. 
This finding is in contrast with the picture of steadily improving governance standards in the 
UK painted by studies focusing on the earlier period (e.g. Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Guest, 
2008; Hillier and McColgan, 2006; Peasnell et al., 2003; Renders et al., 2010; Young, 2000).  
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Second, consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find a statistically as well as economically 
significant positive link between the board index and different measures of a firm’s operating 
performance. This finding suggests that following best practice guidelines can strengthen a 
board’s monitoring capacity, helping mitigate agency costs and enhancing firm operating 
performance. However, our analyses also indicate that investors do not factor in the value of 
strong governance arrangements into share prices. Not only is there no statistical difference 
between contemporaneous Tobin’s Q of strong and weak board index based portfolios, but 
stock returns of better-governed firms are also consistently higher than those of companies 
with weaker board governance arrangements. Moreover, this pattern cannot be explained by 
differing characteristics of the constituents of the two portfolios. Thus, UK investors in the first 
decade of the 21st century appear to remain indifferent to the value of strong governance 
arrangements, in a manner similar to the US investors a decade earlier (cf. Gompers et al., 
2003).  
As discussed at length in the paper, the flexibility offered by the voluntary nature of the 
Code is based on the expectation that firms will choose the governance structures efficiently. 
For instance, when expecting difficult times ahead, firms may decrease compliance to 
strengthen the directing capacity of the board (Hypothesis 2a). Alternatively, driven by 
managerial self-interest, firms may attempt to weaken the board’s monitoring capacity 
(Hypothesis 2b). We provide evidence in support of the latter explanation. Specifically, we find 
that in the wake of looming weak performance, firms in which managers have greater power 
(as captured by their equity holdings) or informational advantage (as proxied by different 
measures of information asymmetry) tend to decrease adherence to the Code. Moreover, this 
decrease is aimed at weakening the monitoring capacity of the board (rather than strengthening 
its directing capacity): we find that it is the independence of key board committees 
(particularly, the remuneration committee), which is sacrificed in the wake of weakening firm 
performance. This result is in contrast to the implications of prior findings, particularly those of 
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Hillier and McColgan (2006), Peasnell et al. (2003), and Young (2000), who on the whole 
suggest that firms use the Code flexibility in an efficient manner, particularly when it comes to 
the use of NEDs, including independent NEDs. Taken together, our results suggest that while 
on the whole adherence to the Code’s voluntary recommendations has strengthened the 
monitoring capacity of the boards of listed firms in UK, firms at times have also behaved 
opportunistically and abused the Code’s flexibility to some extent.  
Our findings also complement the evidence on the absence of effective monitoring by 
investors, in particular, large institutional block holders in the UK (e.g. Arcot et al., 2010; 
Dedman, 2000; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2012). This issue has been recognized by the 
regulators as well and has led to the introduction of the UK Stewardship Code in 2010. This 
code aims to “enhance the quality of engagement between institutional investors and 
companies to help improve long-term returns to shareholders and the efficient exercise of 
governance responsibilities” (Financial Reporting Council, 2010). While the document is still 
relatively recent, future research could examine whether this new regulatory effort translated 
into subsequent increase in shareholders’ engagement and monitoring, largely deficient in the 
period covered by the current study. 
Our study is not without limitations. First, our empirical analyses are based on a single 
country setting. Testing our conjectures regarding opportunistic use of soft regulation in a 
multi-country context would test whether our findings can be generalized beyond the UK and 
whether they could guide regulatory policy internationally. 
Second, we focus only on the associations between a firm’s board monitoring capacity 
and its financial performance. However, we believe that in the light of the general consensus in 
both academic and policy circles about the centrality of the board and its desirable 
characteristics in delivering good governance (Adams et al., 2009, Bhagat et al., 2008; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Financial Reporting Council, 2014; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003), our 
focus on the board is both timely and relevant. Moreover, large body of prior empirical 
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evidence for the UK (e.g. Arcot and Bruno, 2007; Dedman, 2000; Hillier and McColgan, 2006; 
Young, 2000) suggests that adherence to board-related recommendations is not significantly 
related to the presence and strength of other internal governance mechanisms.  
Finally, it is also worth noting here that we focus mainly on one of boards’ many roles, 
namely oversight. While we briefly touch upon the stewardship role of the managers (cf. 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991) in our analysis on the use of Code flexibility, we are silent on the 
important ‘service’ role of the non-executives directors (as per resource dependency theory, 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However, given our focus on the Code’s board-related 
recommendations, analysis of these roles in any detail is beyond the scope of this study. It 
could be fruitfully addressed by future research. 
Our study has a number of important implications. First, the arguments motivating our 
hypotheses meet the postulate that “a model of corporate governance should be consistent with 
both perspectives; it should explain both how some boards are active monitors of management, 
yet how some CEOs are able to avoid scrutiny” (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998, p. 111). Our 
theoretical discussion and related findings are therefore, likely to provide a more realistic 
picture of the dynamics of board governance role than that provided by many prior studies. 
Future work can explore these dynamics in different institutional settings.  
Second, if companies indeed opportunistically choose not to adhere to the Code 
recommendations when poor performance looms, the voluntary approach to governance 
regulation adopted in the UK, as in many other jurisdictions, appears not to be effective (given 
that investors also do not penalize weak governance arrangements). Therefore, we challenge to 
some extent the conclusions reached by Arcot and Bruno (2007) who stress the benefits of 
flexibility offered by the voluntary governance regime. Instead, our conclusions are more 
consistent with the conjecture of MacNeil and Li (2006) who document that non-compliance 
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by some companies is at least tolerated by investors. Hence, there may be scope for a more 
mandatory approach to governance, at least in some aspects of the Code recommendations.  
Third, given that the opportunistic decrease in adherence to the Code is mostly achieved 
by the weakening of independence of key board monitoring committees (rather than a simple 
reduction of the number of independent NEDs on the board), our findings suggest that it is not 
just the proportion of independent directors that matters for board effectiveness, but, perhaps 
more importantly, where these directors sit on the board (corroborating the arguments of Chan 
and Li, 2008, and Yeh et al., 2011). Our findings thus make an empirical contribution to the 
growing literature on the design of the structure and composition of the effective board (Adams 
et al., 2010). If, as argued above, some of the Code’s recommendations were to be mandated, 
the composition of its key monitoring committees appears a worthy likely target of such an 
action. 
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Table 1 
Sample descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
TSR 3.91 -1.88 60.39 -91.00 276.36 
ROA -4.81 3.89 29.65 -194.55 35.55 
ROE -7.34 6.79 110.49 -792.79 450.14 
ROIC -6.38 5.88 51.10 -349.25 81.99 
Tobin’s Q 2.81 1.79 5.51 -16.45 40.16 
Sales (£ millions) 709.02 43.59 2311.61 0.00 15490.00 
Ln(1 + Sales) 3.90 3.97 2.69 -3.67 9.71 
Market capitalization (£ millions) 846.73 57.53 2950.19 0.58 20649.28 
Ln(1 + Market capitalization) 4.24 4.05 2.22 -0.54 9.94 
Total assets (£ millions) 1868.53 62.43 9278.87 0.56 82651.00 
Ln(1 + Total assets) 4.42 4.15 2.27 0.35 11.02 
Leverage 20.49 8.80 30.16 -36.99 195.85 
P/E ratio 1.47 8.50 175.80 -1214.39 1083.30 
Intangibles/Total assets 0.20 0.10 0.23 0.00 0.99 
Std. dev. TSR 16.75 11.74 16.09 2.27 105.36 
EPS analyst forecast dispersion 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.30 
CEO equity ownership 5.70 0.69 10.82 0.00 56.77 
CEO equity-linked wealth 6.17 1.45 10.82 0.00 56.78 
CEO tenure 4.56 2.80 5.01 0.00 24.90 
CEO incentive pay 0.58 0.59 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Note: All financial variables are winsorized at both ends of the distribution at 1% level. TSR denotes total 
shareholder return (which incorporates dividends and capital gains) and is expressed in percentage terms. Sales are 
expressed in millions of pounds. Leverage is measured as a ratio of total debt to total assets. ROA denotes return on 
assets, defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets and is expressed in percentage 
terms. ROE denotes return on equity, defined as the ratio of net income to the book value of equity. ROIC is the 
return on invested capital, as defined by Worldscope database (i.e. (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + 
((Interest Expense on Debt - Interest Capitalized) * (1-TaxRate))) / Average of Previous Year's and Current Year’s 
(Total Capital + Last Year's Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long Term Debt)*100). Tobin’s Q is defined as 
the ratio of the sum of the book value of debt and market value of equity to the book value of total assets. P/E ratio 
denotes price-earnings ratio corresponding to the end of the year t. Market capitalization and total assets are 
expressed in millions of pounds. Intangibles/Total assets is the ratio of the net value of intangible assets (as defined 
in Worldscope) to the value of total assets of the firm. Std. dev. of TSR is defined as the standard deviation of 
monthly total shareholder returns in a particular year. EPS analyst forecast dispersion is the standard dispersion of 1-
year-ahead I/B/E/S analyst forecasts of earnings per share (EPS) scaled by per-share book value of assets at the 
beginning of the period. CEO equity ownership is expressed as the ratio of the value of CEO’s stock holdings to the 
total market capitalization of the firm and is expressed in percentage terms. CEO equity-linked wealth is expressed 
as the ratio of the CEO’s equity-related wealth (i.e. stocks, options, equity-related LTIPs) to the total market 
capitalization of the firm and is expressed in percentage terms. CEO tenure is expressed in years. CEO incentive pay 
is defined as ratio of CEO performance-related pay to the total pay earned by the CEO in a particular year.
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Table 2 
Board governance index components and key board characteristics 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Pooled  
Panel A: Board governance index components 
No CEO/chair duality 84.94% 84.12% 84.46% 85.65% 85.26% 82.50% 82.86% 84.30% 85.21% 85.71% 84.44% 
Percentage of NEDs on the board (at 
least 33%) 89.45% 91.69% 91.58% 92.53% 91.79% 91.03% 90.39% 90.50% 91.97% 92.22% 91.36% 
Majority of NEDs independent 85.78% 84.77% 85.93% 85.73% 80.29% 75.46% 70.53% 67.73% 67.45% 68.07% 74.43% 
Presence of deputy chair and/or 
senior NED 65.60% 67.54% 66.33% 67.89% 62.96% 59.19% 54.61% 48.90% 48.02% 50.13% 56.50% 
Presence of remuneration committee 85.61% 89.89% 91.72% 93.16% 92.23% 89.42% 88.36% 87.11% 88.09% 86.63% 89.00% 
Independent NED chairing 
remuneration committee 72.18% 77.21% 79.89% 81.81% 78.64% 72.75% 69.05% 65.09% 63.76% 63.57% 70.69% 
Remuneration committee composed 
entirely of independent NEDs 54.92% 57.62% 61.24% 62.46% 59.13% 55.50% 53.72% 49.94% 46.35% 47.37% 53.48% 
Presence of audit committee 98.80% 99.04% 98.82% 98.84% 98.93% 98.58% 98.60% 98.51% 99.04% 99.03% 98.81% 
Independent NED chairing audit 
committee 74.58% 79.61% 81.21% 82.50% 77.77% 73.58% 70.52% 67.42% 64.53% 65.24% 71.93% 
At least half of audit committee 
members are independent 87.77% 87.32% 88.17% 88.30% 84.85% 80.83% 76.93% 73.25% 70.10% 71.40% 78.59% 
Presence of nomination committee 70.02% 64.21% 63.47% 63.85% 63.01% 61.83% 60.57% 56.87% 56.21% 58.66% 60.57% 
NED or board chair is chairing 
nomination committee 33.09% 36.28% 37.98% 39.63% 36.31% 33.25% 31.76% 29.47% 29.39% 32.41% 33.15% 
Majority of nomination committee 
members are NEDs 68.11% 63.08% 62.55% 63.04% 62.04% 60.83% 59.32% 55.38% 55.06% 57.41% 59.39% 
Board governance index 9.77 9.89 10.02 10.15 9.91 9.54 9.32 8.97 8.79 8.88 9.38 
Table 2 continues on the next page. 
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Table 2 (continued)  
Panel B: Key board characteristics 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Pooled  
Board size (N) 8.75 8.22 7.96 7.73 7.31 6.94 6.65 6.47 6.37 6.46 6.99 
Number of NEDs 4.34 4.12 4.00 3.95 3.77 3.62 3.49 3.43 3.45 3.56 3.66 
Number of independent NEDs 3.27 3.14 3.12 3.07 2.79 2.56 2.37 2.26 2.25 2.37 2.58 
Note: For each of the index provisions, 1 corresponds to the case when the statement is true and 0 otherwise. Board index is therefore the sum of all the 
provisions. Accordingly a firm which confirms to all provisions gets a score of 13, having the best board composition and structure, while a firm scoring 0 would 
have the worst designed board as per the UK Code.  
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Table 3 
Board governance, operating performance, and firm value 
Panel A: Contemporaneous performance indicators 
Performance measure 
Subsample means Subsample medians 
T-test for equality of 
means Weak governance 
portfolio 
Strong governance 
portfolio 
Weak governance 
portfolio 
Strong governance 
portfolio 
Industry-year median-adjusted ROAt -17.68 0.15 -3.40 1.39 19.01***
Industry-year median-adjusted ROEt -23.01 -3.97 -3.83 2.69 5.30*** 
Industry-year median-adjusted ROICt -26.34 1.30 -5.20 2.30 17.50***
Industry-year median-adjusted Tobin’s Qt 0.71 0.98 -0.15 0.09 1.59 
Panel B: Lead performance indicators 
Performance measure 
Subsample means Subsample medians 
T-test for equality of 
means Weak governance 
portfolio 
Strong governance 
portfolio 
Weak governance 
portfolio 
Strong governance 
portfolio 
Industry-year median-adjusted ROAt+1 -17.35 -0.28 -2.84 1.20 18.23***
Industry-year median-adjusted ROEt+1 -24.08 -8.71 -2.90 2.34 3.86***
Industry-year median-adjusted ROICt+1 -25.30 0.56 -4.18 1.98 16.92***
Industry-year median-adjusted Tobin’s Qt+1 0.52 0.79 -0.18 0.11 1.83† 
Note: †, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. The weak governance portfolio is defined as an equally weighted 
portfolio comprising firms from the lowest quintile of the distribution of the board governance index. The strong governance portfolio is defined as an equally 
weighted portfolio comprising firms from the highest quintile of the distribution of the board governance index. Portfolios are constructed annually. Performance 
indicators are based on the measures defined in Table 1. The analysis is based on the pooled sample of 10 years. The testing procedure does not assume equal 
variances. 
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Table 4 
Four-factor model for weak and strong governance portfolios 
and for the arbitrage portfolio (based on monthly total shareholder returns) for board governance index 
 Excess return on 
weak governance portfolio 
Excess return on 
strong governance portfolio 
Return on the arbitrage portfolio 
(strong – weak) 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Alpha -1.80 -3.37*** 0.02 0.05 1.82 4.40*** 
(RM - RF) 0.20 1.57 0.23 2.46* 0.03 0.30 
SMB 0.18 1.39 0.17 1.82† -0.01 -0.07 
HML 0.04 0.26 0.17 1.65 0.13 1.23 
UMD -0.04 -0.39 0.10 1.24 0.14 1.67† 
Note: †, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. The weak governance portfolio is defined as an equally weighted 
portfolio comprising firms from the lowest quintile of the distribution of the board governance index. The strong governance portfolio is defined as an equally 
weighted portfolio comprising firms from the highest quintile of the distribution of the board governance index. Excess returns are total shareholder returns in 
excess of risk-free rate. The arbitrage portfolio is a zero-investment portfolio consisting of a long position in the strong governance portfolio and a short position 
in the weak governance portfolio (as defined above). Portfolios are constructed annually, i.e. governance provisions in year t are used to construct portfolios the 
performance of which is then analyzed in year (t+1). 
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Table 5 
Operating performance and firm value of index-decreasing firms vis-à-vis matched firms 
Performance measure 
 
 
Subsample means Subsample medians Equality tests 
Index-decreasing 
firms 
Matching firms 
Index-decreasing 
firms 
Matching firms T-test statistic 
Wilcoxon test  
z-statistic 
Industry-year  
median-adjusted ROAt+1 
-9.30 -4.35 -0.73 0.54 4.33*** 4.39*** 
Industry-year  
median-adjusted ROEt+1 
-14.51 -6.24 0.00 0.41 1.52 1.71† 
Industry-year  
median-adjusted ROICt+1 
-17.13 -6.45 -0.93 0.90 4.39*** 4.42*** 
Industry-year  
median-adjusted Tobin’s Qt+1 
0.35 0.51 -0.08 -0.01 0.79 2.10* 
Note: †, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. Index-decreasing firms are companies for which the board governance 
index (defined in Table 2) decreases between years (t-1) and t. For matched firms the value of the index remains the same in both year (t-1) and t. Matching is 
based on year, industry, and size, measured as LN(1 + Sales) as detailed in Section 4.iii. Performance indicators are based on the measures defined in Table 1. 
The analysis is based on the pooled sample of 10 years. 
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Table 6 
Ordered logit models explaining the likelihood of index changes between years t and t+1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Regressors Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Board governance indext -0.16 -14.49*** -0.19 -12.71*** -0.42 -11.39***
Industry-year median-adjusted ROAt 0.00 3.02** 0.00 1.87† 0.00 0.50 
LN(1 + Total assetst) 0.04 1.67† 0.04 1.46 -0.06 -1.24 
LN(Board sizet) 0.13 1.12 0.17 1.12 -0.04 -0.16 
CEO equity ownershipt -0.01 -3.23*** -0.01 -2.52* -0.02 -2.08*
Std. dev. TSRt   -0.60 -1.80† -2.07 -2.69**
EPS analyst forecast dispersiont    -3.74 -1.99*
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Cutoff-1 -4.21 N/A -4.44 N/A -8.25 N/A 
Cutoff-2 -0.33 N/A -0.46 N/A -3.83 N/A
Pseudo-R2 0.03 0.04 0.11 
Log-likelihood -4667.47 -2850.07 -1008.16 
LR test statistic 2(30) = 334.25*** 2(31) = 255.43*** 2(32) = 246.37***
No. of observations 6205 3886 1521 
No. of firms 1409 643 334 
Note: †, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. The dependent variable is a categorical (ordered) variable, which takes the 
value of -1 in cases of firm-years, where the board governance index decreased between years t and t + 1, 0 in cases of firm-years where the board governance 
index remained unchanged between years t and t + 1, and 1 in cases of firm-years where the board governance index increased between years t and t + 1. All the 
regressors are measured in year t. All the other variables above are defined as in Table 1. The analysis is based on the pooled sample of 10 years. 
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Table 7 
Where is compliance weakened if firms decrease their board governance index? 
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1999 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2000 21.05 13.16 5.26 7.89 21.05 15.79 31.58 0.00 5.26 7.89 5.26 0.00 13.16 
2001 11.32 20.75 1.89 26.42 18.87 20.75 30.19 0.00 13.21 11.32 7.55 15.09 9.43 
2002 19.70 18.18 12.12 7.58 7.58 16.67 30.30 0.00 12.12 7.58 0.00 18.18 3.03 
2003 15.52 12.07 12.07 17.24 7.76 14.66 31.90 0.86 18.10 11.21 0.86 31.03 1.72 
2004 18.97 15.52 11.21 12.07 10.34 19.83 38.79 0.00 17.24 12.07 0.86 29.31 1.72 
2005 14.16 17.70 11.50 9.73 14.16 19.47 29.20 0.88 11.50 12.39 2.65 27.43 4.42 
2006 17.83 22.58 14.73 17.05 12.40 21.71 34.88 1.55 14.73 13.18 2.33 17.05 4.65 
2007 16.77 17.96 10.18 13.77 8.98 15.57 38.32 0.00 17.37 12.57 3.59 22.16 4.19 
2008 15.60 10.55 12.84 6.88 21.10 32.11 38.53 2.29 28.90 22.02 16.51 23.85 18.35 
Pooled 16.54 15.94 11.32 12.50 13.48 21.06 35.04 0.89 17.91 13.88 5.51 22.83 7.28 
Note: Year-by-year and pooled percentages of companies switching to non-adherence to a specific Code recommendation among the companies decreasing 
board governance index (defined in Table 2) in a particular year. 
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Table 8 
The effects of board governance and other governance mechanisms on operating performance and firm value 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Dependent variable 
Industry-year 
median-adjusted ROAt+1 
Industry-year 
median-adjusted ROEt+1 
Industry-year 
median-adjusted ROICt+1 
Industry-year 
median-adjusted Tobin’s Qt+1 
Regressors Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Board governance indext 0.58 4.14*** -0.50 -0.75 0.72 2.91** 0.02 0.57 
CEO equity-linked wealtht 0.10 1.73† -0.51 -1.80† 0.10 0.91 0.02 1.22 
CEO incentive payt 5.94 5.04*** 6.91 1.06 12.39 5.80*** 1.12 3.80*** 
Leveraget -0.00 -0.18 0.05 0.78 -0.04 -1.92† -0.00 -1.52 
CEO tenuret 0.24 3.50*** 0.36 1.02 0.43 3.46*** 0.02 1.42
LN(Board sizet) -5.91 -4.44*** -6.76 -1.08 -6.04 -2.54* 0.90 3.10**
LN(1 + Salest) 2.98 14.54*** 4.41 4.98*** 4.83 13.48*** -0.02 -0.44 
Intangibles/Total assetst -17.00 -9.42*** -30.16 -3.94*** -22.14 -6.98*** -0.45 1.24 
Intercept -13.98 -5.02*** -9.47 -0.74 -27.89 -5.67*** -1.73 -2.93**
Log-likelihood -18600.20 -26352.26 -21159.09 -12656.23 
Wald test statistic 2(8) = 426.35*** 2(8) = 66.39*** 2(8) = 353.81*** 2(8) = 33.92***
No. of observations 4405 4414 4399 4417 
No. of firms 1186 1188 1182 1188 
Note: †, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. The variables above are defined as in Table 1. The models are estimated 
using the entire panel of 10 years with standard errors calculated by two-way clustering procedure (Petersen, 2009). All the regressors are lagged one year, i.e. 
performance and firm value in year t + 1 are modeled as a function of independent variables as measured in year t.   
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Table 9 
The effects of board governance and other governance mechanisms on operating performance and firm value 
(controlling for potential endogeneity of the board governance index) 
 Model 4A Model 5A Model 6A Model 7A Model 4B Model 5B Model 6B Model 7B 
Dependent variable 
Industry-year 
median-adjusted 
ROAt+1 
Industry-year 
median-adjusted 
ROEt+1 
Industry-year 
median-adjusted 
ROICt+1 
Industry-year 
median-adjusted 
Tobin’s Qt+1 
Industry-year 
median-adjusted 
ROAt+1 
Industry-year 
median-adjusted 
ROEt+1 
Industry-year 
median-adjusted 
ROICt+1 
Industry-year 
median-adjusted 
Tobin’s Qt+1 
Instrument for board gov. indext Post-2003 dummy LN(1 + Sales t) 
Regressors Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Board governance indext 3.67 5.93*** 8.44 2.05* 4.35 4.18*** 0.24 0.96 6.29 12.12*** 8.20 4.50*** 10.25 11.95*** -0.02 -0.30 
CEO equity-linked wealtht 0.15 2.08* 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.66 0.03 1.50 0.31 3.92*** -0.10 -0.29 0.47 3.44*** 0.01 0.97 
CEO incentive payt 6.08 5.13*** 7.27 0.97 12.34 5.86*** 1.23 3.85*** 5.77 4.30*** 13.60 2.04* 12.54 5.20*** 1.11 3.77*** 
Leveraget 0.00 0.41 0.05 0.70 -0.03 -1.36 -0.00 -1.59 -0.00 -0.31 0.05 0.80 -0.05 -1.95† -0.00 -1.50 
CEO tenuret 0.23 3.31*** -0.30 -0.67 0.33 2.65** 0.02 1.27 0.27 3.37*** 0.23 0.63 0.46 3.19** 0.02 1.45 
LN(Board sizet) -9.02 -6.12*** -36.32 -3.86*** -11.66 -4.45*** 0.68 1.77† -11.35 -6.51*** -17.53 -2.34* -15.70 -5.04*** 0.95 2.86**
LN(1 + Salest) 0.50 1.56 0.27 0.12 1.11 2.00* -0.12 -1.00         
Intangibles/Total assetst -23.46 -11.10*** -66.99 -5.27*** -32.72 -8.35*** -0.41 -1.09 -18.26 -8.54*** -28.93 -3.57*** -21.75 -5.92*** -0.48 -1.33 
Intercept -26.93 -5.20*** -12.65 -0.39 -35.01 -3.63*** -3.15 -1.86† -47.36 -10.58*** -61.56 -3.95*** -84.17 -11.45*** -1.47 -2.12*
R2-overall 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.01 
Wald test statistic 2(8) = 240.99*** 2(8) = 47.30*** 2(8) = 155.92*** 2(8) = 34.21*** 2(7) = 246.44*** 2(7) = 54.86*** 2(7) = 226.35*** 2(7) = 34.22***
No. of observations 4405 4414 4399 4417 4405 4414 4399 4417 
No. of firms 1186 1188 1182 1188 1186 1188 1182 1188 
Note: †, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. Post-2003 dummy equals 0 for observations corresponding to years up to 
and including 2002, and 1 for those from year 2003 onwards. All the other variables above are defined as in Table 1. The models are estimated using the entire 
panel of 10 years as random-effect instrumental-variable panel regressions. All the regressors are lagged one year, i.e. performance and firm value in year t + 1 
are modeled as a function of independent variables as measured in year t.  
